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INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AS A FORUM FOR GENOCIDE CASES
John Quigley*
The international community, in drafting the Genocide Convention 
in 1948, included a submissions clause that provided for jurisdiction in the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) against a state that might violate the 
Convention.1 The drafters were not entirely clear in their wording, however, 
and questions arose as to whether the submissions clause applied only to a 
state’s obligation to prevent and punish genocide committed by others, or 
whether it applied to a state’s obligation to avoid committing genocide itself 
as well.  
The Genocide Convention was directed primarily against individu-
als, making genocide punishable at the level of the individual perpetrator. 
The Genocide Convention, in its substantive provisions, reads like a crimi-
nal law document, defining the offense of genocide in terms of an actus
reus and mens rea. The Genocide Convention requires states to prevent 
genocide, and—if it is committed in a state’s territory—to punish it. 
Throughout the drafting proceedings, the United Kingdom and Bel-
gium sought to include language to make it clear that a state must itself not 
commit genocide. The United Kingdom and Belgium failed to secure a ref-
erence to such an obligation in several of the substantive provisions. They 
did manage, however, to gain the insertion in the submissions clause of a 
phrase that appears to confer jurisdiction on the ICJ over a suit against a 
state for its own perpetration of genocide.2
The issue was not tested until 1993 when Bosnia sued Yugoslavia 
in the ICJ, accusing Yugoslavia of failing to prevent and punish genocide, 
and of perpetrating it. In 1996, the ICJ decided that the Genocide Conven-
tion gave the ICJ jurisdiction over a suit alleging a state’s perpetration of 
genocide.
This essay recounts how the Court arrived at that conclusion, but al-
so assesses the broader jurisdictional picture for the ICJ with regard to acts 
that may be classified as genocide or that may be unlawful under a different 
 *  President’s Club Professor in Law, The Ohio State University. B.A., LL.B., M.A., 
Harvard University.  
1 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 9, Dec. 9, 
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. 
2 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo. (Serb. & Mont.)), Preliminary Objections, 1996 I.C.J. 595, 623 
(July 11).  
File: QUIGLEY (July 14).doc Created on: 7/14/2008 12:54:00 PM Last Printed: 7/16/2008 10:43:00 PM 
244 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 40:243 
legal category. En route, the essay considers the efficacy of ICJ jurisdiction 
on these matters and the Court’s treatment of the issue that sharply raised 
the jurisdictional issue in Bosnia’s suit against Yugoslavia—namely, ethnic 
cleansing.
I. JURISDICTIONAL BASES OTHER THAN GENOCIDE
The jurisdictional bases for the ICJ to deal with atrocities are scant. 
Unless both the potential applicant state and the potential respondent state 
have filed declarations under Article 36(2) of the Court’s Statute, submitting 
themselves to jurisdiction for any and all international legal questions, juris-
diction must be grounded in a treaty.3 With regard to war and peace issues, 
and to issues of individual rights, one finds few treaties that contain a sub-
missions clause. And even when one finds a submissions clause, reserva-
tions are liberally filed to it.  
This was the jurisdictional wasteland that confronted Bosnia when 
it filed an application against Yugoslavia in 1993, seeking a judicial forum 
to stop atrocities connected with what was being called “ethnic cleansing” 
in Bosnia. The Genocide Convention did, at least arguably, give the Court 
jurisdiction over state-perpetrated genocide, but it was anyone’s guess 
whether the Court—even if it found jurisdiction—would consider the facts 
being alleged by Bosnia to constitute genocide. 
Bosnia’s filing represented the first time a state had ever sought a 
judicial injunction against ongoing, widespread atrocities being committed 
against a civilian population. There was little basis on which to predict how 
the ICJ would deal with the matter. 
II. GENOCIDE
Genocide had not been defined substantially beyond what was writ-
ten in the Genocide Convention in 1948. No international court had been 
created that might have entertained penal prosecutions against individuals 
for genocide. One case in Israel had been adjudicated under a statute based 
on—but somewhat different from—genocide as defined in the Genocide 
Convention.4 One case in Cambodia had been adjudicated under the Geno-
cide Convention, but the Cambodian court had done little to elaborate the 
parameters of genocide.5
As a result, there was little learning available either on the legal 
content of genocide, or on the question of whether, even if it could be 
3 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36(2), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1060.  
4 Attorney-General of Isr. v. Adolf Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277 (Isr. S. Ct., 1963).  
5 See GENOCIDE IN CAMBODIA: DOCUMENTS FROM THE TRIAL OF POL POT AND IENG SARY 
461–523 (Howard J. De Nike et al. eds., 2000).  
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shown that a state had committed genocide, jurisdiction would lie in the 
ICJ. 
Beyond all that, of course, lay the uncertain power of the ICJ to 
gain implementation of any order it might issue. The power identified in the 
U.N. Charter for the U.N. Security Council to act to compel compliance 
with an order of the ICJ had never been tested.6 And even though the ICJ 
had been able to gain some compliance with its decisions prior to that time, 
this case involved war, probably the most difficult issue on which to secure 
compliance by an unwilling defendant state. 
Moreover, an interim order, even if obtained, was of uncertain sig-
nificance. By Bosnia’s allegation, the Bosnian Serb militia was then com-
mitting the atrocities with Yugoslavia’s connivance. In light of this, would 
an interim order have any impact on Yugoslavia or on the Bosnian Serb 
militia? As of 1993, the ICJ had not decided whether its interim orders were 
binding on the state against which they were issued. So Yugoslavia might 
have plausibly declined to comply without putting itself in a position of 
violating international law.7 Additionally, the possible impact on the inter-
national community was uncertain. It was unclear whether any interim order 
against Yugoslavia telling it to stop committing genocide would spur any 
action at the international level that might help end the atrocities. 
Nonetheless, Bosnia sought and gained an interim order on April 8, 
1993, in which the Court recognized that Yugoslavia was, at the least, fail-
ing to prevent genocide in Bosnia and requesting that Yugoslavia cease 
what it was doing.8 Bosnia returned to the ICJ in August 1993, explaining 
that Yugoslavia was failing to comply, and the Court granted another inte-
rim order calling on Yugoslavia to implement the April 8 order.9
III. PROOF OF FACTS OF GENOCIDE
Beyond all the uncertain legal issues lay the difficulty of proving 
facts. There had been a U.N. investigation, and it had come to a conclusion 
6 U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 2.  
7 Judge Weeramantry, writing separately to the issuance of the September 13, 1993 order 
and anticipating the Court’s 2001 judgment in LaGrand, discussed in detail the character of 
interim measures and concluded that they were binding. On that basis he found that Yugos-
lavia was in violation of an international legal obligation for its non-compliance with the 
interim measures of April 8, 1993. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo. (Serb. & Mont.)), 1993 I.C.J. 
376–89 (Sept. 13) (separate opinion of Judge Weeramantry) [hereinafter Prevention and 
Punishment Sept]. 
8 Prevention and Punishment Sept., supra note 7; Request for the Indication of Provision-
al Measures, 1993 I.C.J. 1, 24 (Apr. 8).  
9 Prevention and Punishment Sept., supra note 7; Further Requests for the Indication of 
Provisional Measures, 1993 I.C.J. 325, 350 (Sept. 13).  
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adverse to Yugoslavia. It even utilized the phrase “ethnic cleansing.”10 If it 
could be shown that atrocities were being committed in Bosnia and that 
those atrocities could be characterized as genocide, the problem of proving 
the responsibility of Yugoslavia remained.  
The ICJ had previously been criticized in 1984 for allowing itself to 
be drawn into a case that concerned an ongoing military conflict. In that 
case, the United States agued that Nicaragua’s complaint against it should 
be deemed inadmissible because the Court could not adequately determine 
what was occurring on the ground in Central America.11 After the ICJ de-
cided that the suit was admissible, the United States withdrew from the case 
and subsequently withdrew its Article 36(2) declaration of acceptance of the 
Court’s jurisdiction, as well. 
Some of the evidence that Bosnia presented to the ICJ was newspa-
per clippings. Judge Shahabudeen, in a separate opinion in regard to the 
order of September 13, 1993, averted to the use of media reports by the 
United States in the Tehran Hostages case.12 Nicaragua too, in its case 
against the United States, had relied on media accounts to support its allega-
tions.13 Judge Shahabudeen thought it permissible to accept any source of 
information. The media material was adduced largely to demonstrate Yu-
goslavia’s involvement with atrocities being committed by the Bosnian Serb 
militia.14
On September 13, 1993, the ICJ’s issuance of a second interim or-
der in Bosnia’s favor strongly suggested that Yugoslavia was not in com-
pliance with the April 8 interim order, meaning that it was failing to prevent 
genocide. Judge Shahabudeen, in a separate opinion attached to the Sep-
tember 13 order said: “The evidence warrants a finding of non-
implementation against Yugoslavia.”15 Judge Weeramantry, also in a sepa-
rate opinion, described in some detail the evidence presented by Bosnia 
from U.N. observers, from NGOs attesting to mass atrocities against the 
Bosnian Muslims, and from the Serbian government attesting to its contin-
ued provision of aid to the Bosnian Serb militia.16
Bosnia was supplying the ICJ not only with factual information, but 
with legal arguments as well. In its September 13 order, the ICJ addressed 
10 Prevention and Punishment Sept., supra note 7, at 328. 
11 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua. (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1984 
I.C.J. 392, 437. 
12 Prevention and Punishment Sept., supra note 7, at 357–58 (separate opinion by Judge 
Shahabudeen). 
13 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1 I.C.J. 
Pleadings 210–213. 
14 Prevention and Punishment Sept., supra note 7, at 358. 
15 Id. at 365.  
16 Id. at 370ff (separate opinion by Judge Weeramantry).  
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Yugoslavia’s complaints of an “unending flood of sometimes heavy docu-
mentation.”17 The Court said that the submission by the Applicant of a se-
ries of documents up to the eve of, and even during, the oral proceedings of 
August 1993 was “difficult to reconcile with an orderly progress of the pro-
cedure before the Court.”18 The September 13 order concluded, however, 
that the Court, “taking into account the urgency and the other circumstances 
of the matter, considers it possible to receive the documents in question.”19
Yugoslavia had a point in asserting that Bosnia was filing written 
submissions in more than the usual quantity. In fact, during the month of 
August, Bosnia made eight new filings of factual information or legal ar-
gumentation. In the typical case before the ICJ, a state would file only its 
application and nothing more until memorials were due. 
The material being filed was necessary to prove that atrocities were 
continuing, and to examine the many unresolved legal issues. Additionally, 
some of the filings related to the political situation, as a plan emerged in the 
spring of 1993 to divide Bosnia territorially along ethnic lines. This devel-
opment was important to Bosnia's contention that a second interim measures 
order was needed. 
One of the documents Bosnia submitted in this flurry of filings was 
a substantial memorandum I prepared on the concept of complicity, as ap-
plied to a state facilitating genocide being committed by a non-state entity.20
At this time, complicity was an undeveloped issue in international law. The 
Genocide Convention contained a provision rendering complicity culpable, 
along with actual perpetration, but that provision could be seen as oriented 
to individuals, so that its applicability to a state was not obvious. The Inter-
national Law Commission (ILC) was in the preliminary stages of drafting 
what was expected to be a treaty on state responsibility, and in that context, 
the ILC was elaborating a provision that held a state responsible for facili-
tating an international wrong by another state. But complicity of one state in 
aid of another, to say nothing of complicity of a state in aid of a non-state 
entity, was uncharted territory. I had done some of the early scholarly inves-
tigation of complicity, which I used in preparing this memorandum.21
17 Id. at 336.  
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 336–37.  
20 Memorandum from Francis A. Boyle, General Agent for the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina before the International Court of Justice on Imputability to the Judges of the 
International Court of Justice (Aug. 25, 1993), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&k=f4&case=91&code=bhy&p3=0 (follow “25 Au-
gust 1993” hyperlink). 
21 John Quigley, Complicity in International Law: A New Direction in the Law of State 
Responsibility, 57 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 77 (1986). 
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IV. TREATY OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES AS A BASIS FOR 
JURISDICTION
Another of the documents filed in August 1993 asserted a new basis 
for the Court's jurisdiction. In a supplemental pleading that I prepared, Bos-
nia argued that a treaty concluded in 1919 by the World War I Allies with 
Yugoslavia (under its prior name of Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slo-
venes)22 provided a jurisdictional base for Bosnia’s claims against Yugosla-
via.23 Professor Francis Boyle, Bosnia’s Co-Agent, had identified the treaty 
as potentially providing jurisdiction, and asked me to develop the argument, 
resulting in the filing of August 6.24
The 1919 treaty was important for Bosnia because it was not ob-
vious that the ICJ would find jurisdiction in the case on any ground. The ICJ 
had provisionally found jurisdiction under the Genocide Convention—
enough to issue the April 8 order—but this was being challenged by Yugos-
lavia. Moreover, it was unclear which of the alleged atrocities would be 
deemed actionable as genocide. The 1919 treaty opened the possibility of 
bringing in a wider range of atrocities because it required “full protection of 
life and liberty to all inhabitants of the kingdom without distinction of birth, 
nationality, race, language, or religion.”25 It also specifically required the 
Kingdom to assure “security in law and in fact” to “racial, religious or lin-
guistic minorities.”26
If even a modest portion of what Bosnia alleged was true, these 
provisions of the 1919 treaty were being violated. In particular, Bosnia 
sought to present evidence about systematic rape of Bosnian Muslim wom-
en in internment camps, and it was not clear whether the Court would con-
sider this evidence relevant to allegations based on the Genocide Conven-
tion. 
On August 23, the eve of the oral hearings on Bosnia's critical 
second request for provisional measures, Yugoslavia filed a detailed re-
sponse to Bosnia’s argument that jurisdiction would lie under the 1919 
22 Treaty between the Allied and Associated Powers and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats 
and Slovenes (Protection of Minorities), Sept. 10, 1919, n. 17, reprinted in 1 INTERNATIONAL 
LEGISLATION: A COLLECTION OF THE TEXTS OF MULTIPARTITE INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 
OF GENERAL INTEREST 312 (Manley O. Hudson ed., 1931) [hereinafter Kingdom of the 
Serbs].  
23 Amendment to the Application and Additional Grounds of Jurisdiction cited by Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (Aug. 6, 1993), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1= 
3&p2=3&k=f4&case=91&code=bhy&p3=0 (follow “6 August 1993” hyperlink) [hereinafter 
“Aug. 6 Amendment”].  
24 See Id.
25 Kingdom of the Serbs, supra note 22, at art. 2. 
26 Id. 
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Treaty.27 Bosnia’s argument was a complex one, requiring a number of 
steps to get from the 1919 treaty to current jurisdiction over Yugoslavia. 
Yugoslavia's response was correspondingly complex. It was drafted for Yu-
goslavia by Shabtai Rosenne, who, in addition to being the leading expert 
on ICJ jurisdiction and procedure, was a noted scholar on the minority 
rights treaties concluded in the aftermath of the First World War. Rosenne 
argued that the 1919 treaty was no longer in force. 
Bosnia needed to respond to Rosenne’s points at the oral proceed-
ing, scheduled to begin on August 25. The response I prepared formed the 
basis for Bosnia’s response at the hearing of August 26.28
The minorities treaties concluded at the end of the First World War 
were designed to ensure minority rights in states whose territories were 
newly configured, and in which past ethnic tension raised concerns as to the 
treatment of minorities. One of the minorities covered by the 1919 treaty—
indeed specifically mentioned in it—were Bosnian Muslims.29
At the time, Yugoslavia was known as the Kingdom of the Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes. The Kingdom’s minority protection treaty with the 
Allies required it to “assure full and complete protection of life and liberty 
to all inhabitants of the Kingdom without distinction of birth, nationality, 
language, race or religion.”30 In the event of a dispute, the treaty called for 
submission of cases to the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ)31
The ICJ gained jurisdiction provided for in submission clauses that referred 
cases to the Permanent Court of International Justice.32
The treaty allowed for oversight by the League of Nations. Any 
member of the League Council could raise a case in the PCIJ if it thought 
that a minority was being mistreated in violation of the treaty. Another pro-
vision of the 1919 treaty extended that right to any member of the League.33
When the United Nations replaced the League, the U.N. General Assembly 
indicated that it would assume the role of the League in regard to treaties.34
27 Memorandum from Rodoljub Etinski, Agent of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, on 
the Observations of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Concerning the Requests for Indica-
tion of Provisional Measures (Aug. 23, 1993), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/91/13579.pdf. 
28 FRANCIS A. BOYLE, THE BOSNIAN PEOPLE CHARGE GENOCIDE 287–339 (1996) (com-
menting on the proceedings of August 26, 1993, 3:00 p.m. proceedings at the ICJ concerning 
Bosnia v. Serbia on the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide).  
29 Kingdom of the Serbs, supra note 22, at art. 10.  
30 Id. at art. 2.  
31 Id. at art. 11.  
32 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 37, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060.  
33 Kingdom of the Serbs, supra note 22, at art. 16. 
34 Transfer of Certain Functions, Activities, and Assets of the League of Nations, G.A. 
Res. 24 (I), at 35, U.N., U.N. Doc. A/64 (Feb. 12, 1946).  
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The U.N. Secretary-General devoted attention to the minority treaties in the 
early years of the United Nations. Yugoslavia argued that this consideration 
reflected the death of these treaties.35 Bosnia disagreed, arguing that any 
state member of the United Nations stood in the shoes of any state member 
of the League.36 Thus, Bosnia, as a U.N. member state, could sue Yugosla-
via, the successor state to the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, 
for violation of the rights of a minority that had been the object of protec-
tion under the 1919 treaty. 
In its order of September 13, 1993, the ICJ rejected jurisdiction 
based on the 1919 treaty. Without considering all the points raised by Yu-
goslavia, the Court said that the treaty applied only to acts by Yugoslavia 
within its own territory, and that once Bosnia detached itself from Yugosla-
via, Yugoslavia’s obligations to the Bosnian Muslims under the treaty were 
no longer in effect.37
When the case reached the preliminary objections stage, Bosnia 
withdrew the claim of jurisdiction under the 1919 treaty and the parties did 
not brief the issue. Oddly, however, the Court decided to rule on the 1919 
treaty as a possible basis of jurisdiction. As it had done in 1993, it decided 
that the 1919 treaty did not give Bosnia jurisdiction over Yugoslavia. Re-
peating the reason given in 1993, the ICJ decided that the 1919 treaty ap-
plied to Yugoslavia’s treatment of minorities only within Yugoslavia’s bor-
ders. The atrocities alleged by Bosnia occurred in Bosnia, after Bosnia se-
ceded from Yugoslavia in 1992. Therefore, said the Court, the 1919 treaty 
did not cover the atrocities.38
Of course, when the treaty was concluded, the Bosnian Muslims did 
inhabit Yugoslavia’s predecessor state. They separated from the state in 
1991–92, precisely to avoid the discrimination that the treaty was to pre-
vent. Bosnia was not arguing that the treaty applied to all minorities any-
where, but only to those that were protected under the treaty. Bosnia re-
garded the separation as irrelevant for purposes of treaty coverage.39
The issue of the minority treaties may have future significance, be-
cause there were several others,40 plus minority protection provisions in 
35 Memorandum from Rodoljub Etinski, Agent of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, on 
the Observations of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Concerning the Requests for Indica-
tion of Provisional Measures (Aug. 23, 1993), paras. 8, 9, available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/91/13579.pdf. 
36 Aug. 6 Amendment, supra note 23, at 15. 
37 Prevention and Punishment Sept., supra note 7, at 340ff.  
38 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide, supra note 2, at 619–20. 
39 See Aug. 6 Amendment, supra note 23, at 2. 
40 Treaty between the Allied and Associated Powers and Poland art. 12, June 28, 1919, 3 
Malloy 3714; Treaty between the Allied and Associated Powers and Czechoslovakia art. 14, 
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peace treaties,41 and unilateral declarations promising equality to minori-
ties.42 In many instances, minorities still within the borders as they stood at 
the end of the First World War may have occasion to bring a claim.  
V. EFFICACY OF GENOCIDE JURISDICTION
A broader issue raised by the 1993 proceedings is whether it served 
any purpose to seek an interim order from the Court. The Genocide Conven-
tion has been invoked more frequently to prosecute individuals than to bring 
suits against a state. If the Court issues an interim order to stop ongoing 
atrocities, the state may decline to comply. 
Prosecution of individuals rarely occurs quickly. Fear of prosecu-
tion may act as a deterrent, but as far as direct action dealing with a devel-
oping situation is concerned, it is only against the state that legal action can 
occur with a view to stopping one or another of the warring parties. A suit 
against a state may pressure that state, or it may serve to mobilize the opi-
nion of other states. 
As Judge Tonka rightly pointed out in the Court’s 2007 judgment in 
the Bosnia case, the Court’s two interim orders of 1993 did not prevent the 
Srebrenica killings of 1995.43 Nonetheless, the two interim orders of 1993 
may have had some impact. The Security Council utilized the order of April 
8 to make demands on Yugoslavia. In Resolution 819 of April 16, 1993, the 
Security Council took note of the interim measures order of April 8, citing 
the ICJ’s indication that Yugoslavia should immediately do whatever was in 
its power to prevent the commission of genocide. The Security Council also 
criticized the Bosnian Serb militia, describing what was occurring in Bosnia 
as “ethnic cleansing.”44 It called on Yugoslavia to “immediately cease the 
Sept. 10, 1919, 3 Malloy 3699; Treaty between the Allied and Associated Powers and Ru-
mania art. 12, Dec. 9, 1919, 5 L.N.T.S. 335; Treaty on the Protection of Minorities in Greece 
art. 16, Aug. 10, 1920, 28 L.N.T.S. 243. 
41 Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria art. 69, Sept. 10, 
1919, reprinted in 3 MAJOR PEACE TREATIES OF MODERN HISTORY, 1562 (Fred L. Israel ed., 
1967); Treaty of Neuilly art. 57, Nov. 27, 1919, id. at 1727; Treaty of Trianon art. 60, June 4, 
1920, id. at 1863; Treaty of Lausanne art. 44, July 24, 1923, 28 L.N.T.S. 11. 
42 Declaration Concerning the Protection of Minorities in Albania art. 7, Oct. 2, 1921, 
reprinted in 1 INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION: A COLLECTION OF THE TEXTS OF MULTIPARTITE 
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS OF GENERAL INTEREST at 733 (Manley O. Hudson ed., 1931). 
Declaration Concerning the Protection of Minorities in Lithuania art. 9, May 12, 1922, 22 
L.N.T.S. 393. 
43 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide, (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo. (Serb. & Mont.)), 2007 I.C.J. 1, at para. 2 (Feb. 26) [hereinaf-
ter Judgment of Feb. 26] (separate opinion of Judge Tomka). 
44 S.C. Res. 819, U.N. Doc. S/RES/819 (Apr. 16, 1993). 
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supply of military arms, equipment and services to the Bosnian Serb para-
military units.”45
VI. GENOCIDE AND ETHNIC CLEANSING
By its April 8, 1993 order, the Court seemed to take the position 
that ethnic cleansing—perpetrated by the means being used against Bosnian 
Muslims—constituted genocide.46 The Court said that Yugoslavia should 
ensure that any military units supported by it, or any organizations or per-
sons who “may be subject to its control, direction or influence do not com-
mit any acts of genocide, whether directed against the Muslim population of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina or against any other national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group.”47 Judge Tarassov, in a declaration, objected that this lan-
guage was “open to the interpretation that the court believes that the Federal 
Government of Yugoslavia is indeed involved in such genocidal acts.” He 
called this language “very close to a pre-judgment of the merits, despite the 
Court’s recognition that, in an Order indicating interim measures, it is not 
entitled to reach determinations of fact or law.”48
In its 2007 judgment, however, the Court concluded that Yugosla-
via’s acts in 1992–93 did not reflect genocide. In its 2007 judgment, the 
Court focused on the Srebrenica killings of 1995, which it found did consti-
tute genocide. The Court distinguished the Srebrenica killings of 1995 from 
those of 1992–93 in the various internment camps, like Omarska and Kera-
term. It found the former to constitute genocide, but not the latter.49
The Court did not provide a convincing reason for distinguishing 
the two. In both instances, persons were killed with the aim of taking over 
territory free of Bosnian Muslims. Judge Khasawneh pointed out in his dis-
sent that the Krstic appeal chamber of the Yugoslavia tribunal had found 
genocidal intent for the Srebrenica killings on the basis of an aim to rid the 
Srebrenica area of Bosnian Muslims.50 The only difference with Srebrenica 
was that the killings were in higher numbers, and occurred in a shorter pe-
riod of time.  
The Court did acknowledge the ethnic cleansing aim behind the 
Srebrenica killings. The judges quoted the trial chamber of the Yugoslavia 
tribunal in Blagojevic, a case that concerned the Srebrenica killings, in find-
ing that:  
45 Id. 
46 Judgment of Feb. 26, supra note 43, at para. 50 (dissenting opinion of Judge Mahiou).  
47 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide (Bosn. & Herz v. Yugo. (Serb. & Mont.)), 1993 I.C.J. 24, at para. 52 (Apr. 8). 
 37 Id. at 27 (Declaration of Judge Tarassov).  
 38 See Judgment of Feb. 26, supra note 43, at paras. 269, 297, 471.  
 39 See id. at para. 41 (dissenting opinion of Vice-President Al-Khasawneh).  
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The Bosnian Serb forces not only knew that the combination of the kil-
lings of the men and the forcible transfer of the women, children and el-
derly, would inevitably result in the physical disappearance of the Bosnian 
Muslim population of Srebrenica, but clearly intended through these acts 
to physically destroy this group.51
The Court did not explain what it understood the Blagojevic trial 
chamber to have meant by the words “physically destroy this group.” The 
word “group” here apparently refers to the Bosnian Muslims, who were in 
Srebrenica at the time, and not only to the men whom the Army of the Serb 
Republic (VRS) killed. Thus, the majority of Bosnian Muslims at Srebreni-
ca were not physically destroyed, but were forcibly removed. The apparent 
purpose of killing the men was to prevent the reconstitution of a Bosnian 
Muslim population in Srebrenica and the surrounding area. 
The Court does not explain how this scenario differs from the VRS 
actions of 1992–93. There too, Bosnian Muslims were killed, and other acts 
of violence, including rape, were perpetrated with the aim of terrorizing the 
population to flight, so that the territory would become devoid of Bosnian 
Muslims. Yet the Court found insufficient evidence of an intent to destroy, 
as required for genocide.52 Nevertheless, evidence was available of a con-
certed plan to attach the areas involved in both these episodes to Serbia, 
without their Bosnian Muslim inhabitants. If the VRS intended to physically 
destroy the Bosnian Muslims at Srebrenica in July 1995, it is not clear why 
it did not intend to physically destroy the Bosnian Muslims at the locations 
of the atrocities perpetrated in 1992–93. 
What the Court resorts to, by relying on the Yugoslavia tribunal’s 
trial chamber in the Krstic case, is an analysis of numbers based on the 
Court’s questionable prior conclusion that genocide is committed only when 
some level of substantiality is reached with respect to the population ‘tar-
geted.’ The Court, quoting the trial chamber in Krstic, said that there were 
40,000 Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica in July 1995. Although, it says, this 
represented only a small percentage of the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
“the importance of the Muslim community of Srebrenica is not captured 
solely by its size.”53
 40 Id. at para. 294 (quoting Prosecutor v. Blagojevic, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, 
para. 677 (Jan. 17, 2005)). 
52 Id. at paras. 277, 319, 354, 334. In regard to physical or mental harm, the court did not 
mention the contrary analysis of the Akayesu trial chamber, which found that rape, as in-
flicted in Rwanda in 1994, reflects genocidal intent. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. IT-
96-4-T, Judgment, para. 731 (Sept. 2, 1998).  
53 Judgment of Feb. 26, supra note 43, at para. 296 (quoting Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. 
IT-98-33-A, Judgment, para. 15 (Apr. 19, 2005)).  
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The logic here is that the VRS intended to destroy 40,000. But there 
had been an effort to remove the Bosnian Muslims from the entire eastern 
sector of Bosnia, so killing 7,000 at Srebrenica could just as easily be cha-
racterized as part of an intent to destroy the entire Bosnian Muslim popula-
tion of eastern Bosnia. The killings and other atrocities of 1992–93 at the 
internment camps had the same aim. 
The Court’s willingness to characterize the Srebrenica killings as 
genocide, based on the context for those killings as the Court found it, 
shows that the Court does not view forced departure as inconsistent with 
genocide, so long as the acts and intent required for genocide are present. 
Indeed, the Court explicitly stated that ethnic cleansing, on those bases, may 
constitute genocide.54 In the 1992–93 episodes, as with Srebrenica in 1995, 
the VRS carried out terror, violence, and organized evacuations in tandem.55
The Court considered evidence that the VRS destroyed religious 
and cultural objectives, as it determined whether the VRS had created con-
ditions of life calculated to destroy the Bosnian Muslims. The Court found 
the destruction to have occurred but said that it did not qualify as creating 
such conditions. The Court did not mention this destruction of religious and 
cultural objectives when deciding the issue of whether or not the VRS in-
tended to destroy the Bosnian Muslims. Although destruction of religious 
and cultural objectives is not an act prohibited under Article 2(c) of the Ge-
nocide Convention, it may well be relevant, when acts in violation of Ar-
ticle 2 are committed, to determining whether those acts are carried out with 
intent to destroy the group. Certainly, destroying a group’s museums, libra-
ries, historical archives, monuments, or religious buildings may provide 
evidence of an intent to destroy the group.
VII. ETHNIC CLEANSING IN THE YUGOSLAVIA TRIBUNAL’S JURISPRUDENCE
The Court relied heavily on the fact that the ICTY prosecutor gen-
erally avoided prosecutions for genocide. The Court stated: “[We have] 
carefully examined the criminal proceedings of the ICTY and the findings 
of its Chambers, cited above, and observe[] that none of those convicted 
were found to have acted with specific intent.”56 By the proceedings “cited 
above,” the Court was referring to cases arising out of the 1992–93 activity 
of the VRS. In one case, however, the ICTY appeals chamber found a geno-
cide conviction to be appropriate. Goran Jelisic was charged by the ICTY 
prosecutor with genocide. He was acquitted at trial, on a finding that he 
lacked genocidal intent, but the appeals chamber said that the evidence 
54 Id. at para. 190.  
55 See id. at paras. 329–32. 
56 Id. at para. 277.  
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showed genocidal intent, and that he should have been convicted of geno-
cide.57
Moreover, the genocide indictments of Mladic and Karadzic were 
active as of 2007 and the allegations ranged well beyond Srebrenica, en-
compassing the ethnic cleansing of 1992–93. These indictments charged an 
intent to destroy the Bosnian Muslims on the basis of “acts of physical and 
psychological abuse” at Omarska, Keraterm, and other detention facili-
ties.”58
The Court’s reliance on non-prosecution for genocide in the ICTY 
is, in any event, questionable. The ICTY prosecutor had the option—which 
the ICJ did not59—of charging individuals with war crimes or crimes against 
humanity, and thereby gaining the same potential sentence of imprisonment. 
Since prosecuting for genocide requires proof of the intent to destroy a 
group—over and above the intent that must be proved concerning imme-
diate acts—a prosecutor might well avoid charging genocide, even in cases 
where genocide might be provable. 
On the issue of whether an overall plan existed for genocide, the 
Court said that,  
significantly, the proposition is not consistent with the findings of the 
ICTY relating to genocide or with the actions of the Prosecutor, including 
decisions not to charge genocide offenses in possibly relevant indictments, 
and to enter into plea agreements, as in the Plavsic and Sikirica et al. Cas-
es (IT-00-40 and IT-9508), by which the genocide-related charges were 
withdrawn.60
A plea agreement, however, hardly demonstrates an absence of the crime 
charged. For a prosecutor, it is quite rational to drop a genocide charge if 
the accused is willing to plead to a crime against humanity. That action by 
the prosecutor in no way implies that the genocide charge is not sustainable. 
The Court notes that in a number of Srebrenica-related ICTY cases, 
genocide was not charged.61 It is not clear what point the Court is trying to 
make. The Court itself decided that genocide was committed at Srebrenica, 
and of course, the ICTY did as well. The fact that some Srebrenica figures 
57 Prosecutor v. Jelisi, Case No. IT-95-10-A, Judgment, paras. 42–52 (July 5, 2001). 
58 Prosecutor v. Karadzic & Mladic, Case No. IT-95-5, IT-95-18, Indictment, paras. 17–18 
(July 24, 1995). 
59 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide, supra note 43, at para. 277 (The court stated the following: “The killings outlined above 
may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity, but the Court has no jurisdiction to 
determine whether this is so.”).  
60 Id. at para. 374.  
61 Id. at para. 375.  
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were charged with genocide while others were not, in no way implies that 
genocide was not committed at Srebrenica. 
Judge ad hoc Mahiou rightly questioned the Court’s reliance on 
non-convictions in the ICTY as evidence that genocide had not occurred. 
An individual commander may execute orders that implement genocide 
without understanding that genocide is being perpetrated.62 Moreover, there 
may be state-perpetrated genocide, even though an individual implementing 
that genocide cannot be convicted due to a lack of genocidal intent.
VIII. PATTERN OF ATROCITIES AS REFLECTING GENOCIDAL INTENT
The Court said that it did not find an intent to destroy proved by the 
pattern of atrocities perpetrated by the VRS.63 The Court did find, however, 
that there was a plan, attributable not only to the VRS, but also directly to 
Yugoslavia,64 to expel the Bosnian Muslims from the area to be attached to 
Serbia.65 Furthermore, the Court found facts regarding treatment in the in-
ternment camps that were consistent across a number of camps, and there-
fore not attributable to the whims of particular camp guards or commanders. 
The treatment, which involved acts described in Art. 2 of the Genocide 
Convention, was aimed at terrorizing the population to flight, in conformity 
with the stated plan to force the evacuation of the Bosnian Muslim popula-
tion. Judge Khasawneh thought that one might reasonably infer a genocidal 
intent from these practices, as had the ICTY and ICTR in a number of cas-
es.66
The Court also said that, as of the date of the Court’s judgment, the 
ICTY had made no finding of genocide for conduct in Bosnia, other than at 
Srebrenica.67 The Court used this fact to negate Bosnia’s argument that the 
pattern of similar conduct at many locations in Bosnia showed genocidal 
intent. Yet, as Judge Khasawneh and Judge ad hoc Mahiou pointed out in 
dissent, in the relevant cases the ICTY was dealing with the guilt of a par-
ticular person, whose conduct did not encompass the entirety of the territo-
ry.68 When the ICTY prosecutor indicted individuals at the highest echelon 
62 Id. at para. 54 (dissenting opinion of Judge Mahiou).  
63 Id. at para. 373. 
64 Id. at para. 371.  
65 Id. at para. 372. 
66 Id. at paras. 43–47 (dissenting opinion of Vice-President Al-Khasawneh). 
67 Id. at para. 374. As noted, the Jelisic appeals chamber decision did find genocide, even 
though the trial chamber had not. 
68 Id. at paras. 42, 53 (dissenting opinion of Judge Mahiou). The ICTY did acquit Momci-
lo Krajisnik of genocide, even though his conduct spanned the entire territory. Prosecutor v. 
Krajisnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Judgment (Sept. 27, 2006). Nevertheless, the fact that Kra-
jisnik personally may, in the ICTY’s view, have not entertained genocidal intent does not 
mean that such an intent did not exist for the VRS, or for Yugoslavia. 
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whose conduct extended throughout the territory—namely Mladic and Ka-
radzic—it did, as already noted, indict for genocide.
IX.  STATE PERPETRATION OF GENOCIDE
Genocide as a legal category is more critical with respect to state-
to-state complaints than criminal prosecution of individuals. Individuals, if 
prosecuted in an international forum, can be charged with crimes against 
humanity, or, if in wartime, with war crimes. If prosecuted in a domestic 
forum, an individual can be charged with murder or other acts against the 
person.69 But to sue a state for genocide in the ICJ, genocide may be the 
only basis for jurisdiction. 
A state party can be sued for the perpetration of genocide by anoth-
er state party only if the Genocide Convention imposes an obligation not to 
commit genocide. The Court, affirming its 1996 judgment in the case, read 
the Genocide Convention as imposing such an obligation, although the 
Court eventually decided in its 2007 judgment that Yugoslavia had not done 
so. In the 2007 judgment, Judges Owada, Shi, Koroma, Tonka, and Skotni-
kov disagreed with the Court on its conclusion that the Genocide Conven-
tion is violated by a state that itself perpetrates genocide. These five judges 
said that, regardless of the evidence, a state party does not violate the Geno-
cide Convention if it perpetrates genocide.70 Judge Shi, who was on the 
Court in 1996, had expressed the same view in the Court’s 1996 judgment 
on jurisdiction.71
The majority of the Court read Article 9, which states that a state 
party may sue another “for genocide,” as covering genocide committed by a 
state party.72 The majority also viewed an obligation not to commit geno-
cide as implicit in the Article 1 obligation to prevent genocide:  
It would be paradoxical if States were thus under an obligation to prevent, 
so far as within their power, commission of genocide by persons over 
whom they have a certain influence, but were not forbidden to commit 
such acts through their own organs . . . In short, the obligation to prevent 
69 Charging genocide in domestic court has generally been done to highlight how bad the 
person was, rather than as necessary to secure a conviction. For a review of domestic geno-
cide prosecutions, see JOHN QUIGLEY, THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION: AN INTERNATIONAL LAW
ANALYSIS 23–49 (2006). 
70 See infra notes 72–77.  
71 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo. (Serb. & Mont.) 1996 I.C.J. 631 (July 11) (joint declaration of 
Judge Shi and Judge Vereshchetin), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/7355. 
pdf.
72 See Judgment of Feb. 26, supra note 43, at para. 169.  
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genocide necessarily implies the prohibition of the commission of geno-
cide.73
Judges Shi and Koroma responded that one cannot so lightly infer 
such a significant obligation as that not to commit genocide:
[I]f the Convention was intended to establish an obligation of such grave 
import as one that could entail some form of criminal responsibility of pu-
nishment of a State by an international tribunal such as this Court for ge-
nocide, this would have been expressly stipulated in the Convention, but 
the convention did not do so.74
Judge Owada similarly viewed it as inadmissible to read in an obli-
gation not specified:
It seems to me absolutely clear form the very title and the whole structure 
of the Convention that the object and purpose of the convention is to make 
a solemn compact among the States parties to the Convention to ‘confirm 
that genocide [as defined by the Convention] is a crime under internation-
al law’ and to ‘undertake to prevent and to punish’ this international crime 
. . .”75
Judge Tonka said that Article 1’s purpose was to proclaim “geno-
cide is a crime under international law” and to seek “the enactment of its 
prohibition in internal criminal laws.”76 He saw nothing in Article 1 that 
prohibited a state from committing genocide. Judge Skotnikov similarly 
found no basis for an “unstated obligation” on states not to commit geno-
cide in a provision that was penal in character.77
Judges Owada, Shi, Koroma, Tonka, and Skotnikov, stating the 
matter in penal terms, reflected a conceptual ambiguity that had caused dif-
ficulty as the Genocide Convention was being drafted. The Genocide Con-
vention was, to be sure, a penal convention in that it defined an offense and 
required states to act in particular ways to prevent and to punish it. In this 
sense, the Genocide Convention is similar to later treaties on issues such as 
terrorist acts and violence against diplomats. The United Kingdom, which 
promoted inclusion of specific language on a state’s obligation not to com-
mit genocide, stressed, however, that such liability would not be of a penal 
character but would be in the nature of the responsibility a state bears for 
any internationally wrongful act.78
73 Id. at para. 166.  
74 Id. at para. 4 (Joint Declaration of Judges Shi and Koroma).  
75 Id. at para. 45 (separate opinion of Judge Owada).  
76 Id. at para. 44 (separate opinion of Judge Tomka).  
77 Id. at para. 4 (Declaration of Judge Skotnikov).  
78 See QUIGLEY, supra note 69, at 227–33. 
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The United Kingdom was unable to gain the insertion of language 
about a state’s obligation not to commit genocide in the substantive provi-
sions of the Genocide Convention precisely for the reason that Judges Owa-
da, Shi, and Koroma now cite; namely, that the delegates viewed the Geno-
cide Convention as a penal convention. The delegates did not, however, 
take the matter to the length which Judges Owada, Shi, and Koroma did. 
They did not understand how a state could incur penal responsibility—
hence the reluctance to insert the provision sought by the United King-
dom.79 When it came to Article 9, however, the other states, urged by the 
United Kingdom, agreed to the phrase that gives the Court jurisdiction over 
suits against a state “for genocide.” 
This phrasing covers state-perpetrated genocide. The Court’s major-
ity cited the phrase “for genocide” in Article 9, which is as it appears in the 
English text of the Genocide Convention. It also cited the rendition in the 
French text, which is “en matière de génocide.”80 The Court’s position 
would have been enhanced even more had it cited the Russian and Chinese 
texts of Article 9. The Russian text adds a noun not present in the English 
text, to say that a state is subject to ICJ jurisdiction “for the perpetration of 
genocide.” The Chinese text, employing a different syntax entirely, renders 
a state party subject to ICJ jurisdiction for harming a category (race) of 
people. The Russian and Chinese texts seem, perhaps even more clearly 
than the English text, to subject a state to ICJ jurisdiction for the perpetra-
tion of genocide.81 The “harming” in the Chinese text and the “perpetration” 
in the Russian text both seem to refer to the state as the subject of the action. 
The Russian text, to be sure, does not say “for its perpetration of genocide,” 
but rather “for the perpetration of genocide,” thus, in theory, leaving open 
the possibility that a state could be responsible only for the perpetration of 
genocide by others.82
The majority’s conclusion is warranted notwithstanding the objec-
tions of Judge Owada, who, after recounting the U.K.’s failure to gain the 
insertion of a clause on state-perpetrated genocide in Genocide Convention, 
expressed doubt that the delegates voting in favor of the “for genocide” 
phrase in Article 9 understood “its impact upon the essential character and 
the scope of the convention.”83 Tellingly, however, Judge Owada noted, 
79 Judgment of Feb. 26, supra note 43, at paras. 63–64 (separate opinion of Judge Owada). 
80 Id. at para. 169.  
81 See QUIGLEY, supra note 69, at 237.  
82 The Russian language does not use definite articles; hence there is no difference in 
Russian between “for the perpetration of genocide” and “for perpetration of genocide.” It is 
open to a translator to insert, or omit, a definite article when translating into English. See
generally R.F. Christian, Some Consequences of the Lack of a Definite and Indefinite Article 
in Russian, 5 THE SLAVIC AND EAST EUR. J. 1 (1961).
83 Judgment of Feb. 26, supra note 43, at para. 68 (separate opinion of Judge Owada). 
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quite correctly, that a great majority of the delegates who participated in the 
debate were in general consensus that this new formulation should not be 
aimed at “criminalizing a State as such for perpetrating the act of geno-
cide.”84 What they voted for was a provision that subjected a state party to 
ICJ jurisdiction for its own perpetration of genocide, but with genocide con-
ceived for this purpose as an internationally wrongful act, rather than as a 
crime. 
Judge Owada ultimately agreed with the majority’s proposition that 
Article 9 subjects a state party to suit for its own perpetration of genocide, 
but not on the basis of state-perpetrated genocide being covered by Article 
1. Rather, he said, Article 9 reflects a subjection to ICJ jurisdiction for the 
obligation found in customary international law not to commit genocide.85
Judge Tonka also objected to the majority’s analysis of Article 9. 
He read the Article 9 clause on responsibility of a state “for genocide” to 
mean that a state may be responsible “on the basis of attribution to the State 
of the genocidal acts perpetrated by persons.”86 Judge Tonka had in mind a 
situation in which genocide is committed by an individual where “a certain 
relationship existed between the individual perpetrator of the genocide and 
the State in question.”87 If that is true, however, then one is looking at state-
perpetrated genocide, since a state is responsible for genocide on the basis 
of its commission by persons whose acts are attributable to that state. A 
state is responsible for committing genocide, not only if its highest authori-
ties are behind the enterprise, but also when the genocidal acts and intent 
are those of persons for whom it is accountable.88
The Court’s conclusion that state-perpetrated genocide is necessari-
ly included within the prohibition to prevent is sound. If evidence shows 
that a state, through its organs, is perpetrating genocide, it would, as a mat-
ter of logic, be the case that the state is failing to prevent genocide. 
X. RESERVATIONS TO THE SUBMISSION CLAUSE OF THE GENOCIDE
CONVENTION
An issue that critically affects the Court’s ability to deal with geno-
cide is the legality of reservations that states have filed to Article 9, the 
submissions clause. May states party to the Genocide Convention freely 
exempt themselves from the Court’s jurisdiction when they commit geno-
cide themselves or when they fail to prevent it when committed by others? 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at para. 73.  
86 Id. at paras. 56, 61(v) (separate opinion of Judge Tomka).  
87 Id. at 56. 
88 Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Report of the International 
Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 56 Sess., Supp. No. 10, art. 4, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001).  
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In 1999, the Court answered this question in the affirmative when Yugosla-
via sued ten states for genocide. Two of them, Spain and the United States, 
had reservations to Article 9. The Court held that, based on their reserva-
tions, Spain and the United States were not required to answer Yugoslavia’s 
allegations.89
Yugoslavia did not try to challenge the validity of these reserva-
tions; hence, the Court did not hear argument on the point. The Court stated 
its conclusion only perfunctorily that Spain and the United States were not 
subject to its jurisdiction. In a later case, however, the point was hotly con-
tested. The Democratic Republic of Congo (Congo) sued Rwanda for mass 
atrocities that, according to Congo’s allegations, were attributable to Rwan-
da during a military incursion into Congo. Congo claimed jurisdiction under 
the Genocide Convention, but Rwanda had reserved to Article 9. 
In a 2006 judgment on jurisdiction, the Court ruled—consistent 
with its 1999 position—that Rwanda was not subject to the Court’s jurisdic-
tion on a genocide allegation by virtue of its reservation to Article 9.90 The 
Court addressed, albeit briefly, Congo’s argument that a reservation to Ar-
ticle 9 is inconsistent with the object and purpose of the Genocide Conven-
tion, and hence invalid. The Court said: 
Rwanda’s reservation to Article IX of the Genocide Convention bears on 
the jurisdiction of the Court, and does not affect substantive obligations re-
lating to acts of genocide themselves under that Convention. In the cir-
cumstances of the present case, the Court cannot conclude that the reserva-
tion of Rwanda in question, which is meant to exclude a particular method 
of settling a dispute relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment 
[sic] of the Convention, is to be regarded as being incompatible with the 
object and purpose of the Convention.91
Five judges writing separately questioned the Court’s distinction 
between a reservation on jurisdiction and a reservation that might relate to a 
“substantive obligation” of a treaty.92 In some treaties—human rights trea-
ties in particular—the jurisdiction accorded to a monitoring or decision-
making body might be the essence of the treaty. The five judges suggested, 
in particular, that were a state party to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights to reserve to the provisions of the Covenant requiring it 
89 Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Spain), 1999 I.C.J. 772 (June 2); Legality of Use of 
Force (Yugo. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 924 (June 2). 
90 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Dem. Rep. 
Congo v. Rwanda) (Judgment of Feb. 3, 2006), para. 70, available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/126/10435.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2007).  
91 Id. at para. 67. 
92 Id. at para. 21 (separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, Elarby, and Simma). 
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to report periodically to the Human Rights Committee, such a reservation 
would be “contrary to the object and purpose of the Covenant.”93
Although the five judges did not go so far as to find that the Court 
had jurisdiction over Rwanda, they questioned “the Court’s repeated finding 
that a reservation to Article IX of the Genocide Convention is not contrary 
to the object and purpose of that treaty.”94 They limited their separate opi-
nion to their assertion that the question of whether a reservation to Article 9 
is contrary to the object and purpose of the Genocide Convention should not 
be left solely to the other state party, but is legitimately an issue for the 
Court.95 They suggested that the Court might usefully revisit the question of 
the validity of a reservation to Article 9.96
Judge Koroma, going farther, dissented, saying that Rwanda’s res-
ervation to Article 9 was invalid and therefore, the Court had jurisdiction 
over Congo’s application. Judge Koroma cited the Court’s 1996 judgment 
on jurisdiction in the Bosnia case, in which the Court said that the Genocide 
Convention’s obligations were erga omnes. “Hence,” he wrote: 
[A] State which denies the Court’s jurisdiction to enquire into allegations 
alleging violation of the Convention would not be lending the co-operation 
required to ‘liberate mankind from [the] . . . odious scourge’ of genocide 
or to fulfil [sic] the object and purpose of the Convention. Denying re-
course to the Court essentially precludes judicial scrutiny into the respon-
sibility of a state in a dispute relating to the violation of the Convention.”97
The fact that an obligation is erga omnes goes to the character of 
the obligation—whether the obligation is one owed only to another state, or 
to the community of states generally. It does perhaps—and this is Judge 
Koroma’s use of the concept—go to the importance of the obligation. Judge 
Koroma, in effect, stated that the submissions clause is of the essence of the 
Genocide Convention, because calling a state to account for committing 
genocide, or for failing to prevent it, is the essence of the Convention. 
If the Court takes up the suggestion of the five judges to think hard 
about whether a reservation to Article 9 is valid, and if it decides for inva-
lidity, the Genocide Convention will be a more serious mechanism for com-
bating genocide. Indeed, the argument for invalidity is quite plausible. The 
United Kingdom and the Netherlands have both objected to Article 9 reser-
vations on the ground that the reservations are incompatible with the object 
and purpose of the Genocide Convention.98
93 Id.
94 Id. at para. 3.  
95 Id. at para. 28. 
96 Id. at para. 29. 
97 Id. at para. 21 (Koroma, J., dissenting).  
98 See QUIGLEY, supra note 69, at 217–21.  
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XI. SUITS BY NON-INVOLVED STATES PARTY TO THE GENOCIDE
CONVENTION
Judge Koroma mentioned, as indicated, the Court’s 1996 reference 
to the Genocide Convention as one whose obligations are erga omnes. That 
fact opens the possibility of broad use of the Genocide Convention to stop 
atrocities. Suit may be brought not only by a state in whose territory another 
commits genocide, or a state against whose nationals another commits ge-
nocide, but also by any other state party to the Convention. The underlying 
rationale is that the obligation not to commit genocide is owed to all other 
states parties. This rationale applies not only to genocide, but also to human 
rights obligations generally.99 A limitation comes with reservations to the 
Genocide Convention’s submissions clause, to be sure, since suit can be 
brought only by a state that has not reserved to it, and only against a state 
that has not reserved to it. 
Despite this possibility, to date, no Genocide Convention suit has 
been filed by a state that did not regard itself or its nationals as victims of 
the genocide alleged. States often protest over rights violations that do not 
directly affect them, but rarely do they go so far as to initiate legal action.100
Yet, as international pressure increases to deal with human rights violations, 
non-involved states may view suit as an appropriate response. 
CONCLUSION
The utility of the Genocide Convention to counteract atrocities is 
limited both by the ICJ’s limited jurisdiction and by the Court’s narrow 
reading of genocide, particularly in the context of ethnic cleansing. On the 
jurisdictional side, there is great need for wider-ranging submissions to ju-
risdiction if the Court is to have any possibility of dealing with atrocities 
perpetrated by a state. The Genocide Convention presents a potentially 
broad scope of jurisdiction, because any State party may sue any other, at 
least if a reservation to the submissions clause has not been filed by either 
state. Unfortunately, reservations to the Genocide Convention’s submissions 
clause limit the Court’s jurisdiction. Yet, the Court’s recent questioning of 
these reservations may lead it to rule such reservations invalid. 
99 See id. at 246–59.  
100 For a case in which non-involved states did file, see The Greek Case, 1969 Y.B. EUR.
CONV. ON H.R. (Eur. Comm’n of H.R.).  
